

12 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DD/I

SUBJECT : Comments on 5 April Draft

1. While admiring greatly your organization, and your presentation of what you have said -- I would like to argue that you have addressed yourself to a rather limited, and therefore basically wrong, concept of the job to which intelligence is going to have to address itself in the years ahead. In a nutshell, your paper seems to suggest that the principal aim of U.S. intelligence -- as an element of national power in the U.S. vs. the Soviet struggle -- will continue to be the assessment of Soviet military capabilities, and the likelihood of Soviet attack. May I dissent?

2. Let me urge that with an increasingly-clear "military stand-off," and the probability of more and more agreements to limit the development and use of nuclear power as well as of conventional armaments, generally -- the Free-World/Communist struggle is almost certain to become more and more one of political, informational (propagandistic), economic, sociological and ideologic forces. Therefore U.S. intelligence has got to desert its earlier, historical preoccupation with military, para-military, and clandestine activities -- and become not only an all-source analysis but an all-forces approach to international power relationships.

3. It seems to me the chief task facing intelligence will be rather less a sharpening and pointing up of present intelligence activities directed at present priority targets, than it will be a challenge to find ways of better focusing "all the knowledge and technical talent available in and to the government" [NSCID 1] on the world-wide struggle for the loyalties of mankind, as a whole. We are going to have to recognize that a race riot in Alabama can do us as serious damage in the struggle for the minds of men, all over the world, as a new Soviet space or missile achievement might do. We shall have to recognize that "intelligence" must be equated to "the sum total of our knowledge" on the world situation, to the extent such knowledge may be pertinent to the making of governmental decisions -- on internal or external affairs. This does not preclude retaining a very special place for the old-style

"military capabilities and intentions" type of estimate. Indeed, this may continue to represent the highest single priority for intelligence effort, and it is likely to be the one to which "sensitive" intelligence activities are primarily directed. But over and above this traditional effort I would envisage that intelligence must either:

- a. expand to its real potential for becoming the sum total of knowledge necessary to evaluate the total international-power situation, and to guide governmental decisions affecting it, or

- b. find itself reduced in importance to a sort of "watch" effort on the formal military-political situation -- while other more farsighted elements in the government develop the knowledge and analysis necessary to influence the important day-to-day decisions affecting international relationships and their basis in the material strengths and ideologic loyalties of peoples everywhere.

4. Along this same line, I am equally confident that the second major task facing intelligence must be to make its conclusions more widely available -- in order that U.S. national decisions shall be effectively influenced by our best analysis of the situation. This seems to have three separate aspects:

- a. reaching and influencing a much wider circle of top officials within the U.S. government including, particularly, important cabinet-members (and their departments or agencies) not members of the NSC,

- b. reaching and influencing the legislative branch of the government very much more systematically than we have hitherto ever considered, in order that the Congress may more effectively support Administration policy in the entire gamut of Congressional actions -- not just in military-political matters -- and

- c. finding a means of better informing the general U.S. public about the true situation developing around the world.

5. To me, paragraphs 3 and 4, above, should be the Romeo and Juliet of your production. Your first draft seems rather like an effort to produce a Shakespearian drama about the Montagues and Capulets based primarily on old Montague and old Capulet, and hardly mentioning the two younger parties who became the real focus of the problem. Although such an analogy may seem a bit frivolous, I mean

to press this point of view with great earnestness. It seems to me we face a major shift in the primary means by which the world struggle will be carried on, and in the degree U.S. decisions affecting these means must be reached with national understanding and support. Your analysis ought to bring these points out loud and clear.



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